Texas Supreme Court: Religion is a Complete Defense to Child Abuse

Texas’ high court ruled yesterday that a former parishioner could not sue her church for emotional distress incurred as a result of a traumatic and disturbing exorcism. The ruling essentially allows religion to be a shield against laws of general application; if you perpetrate some bizarre ritual that potentially damages the emotional or physical well-being of your parishioners, as long as you plead a religious exemption, you’re immune from suit. While Bobby Jindal may be okay with that ruling – we know how he feels about exorcisms – this is wrong on law and wrong on policy.

The opinion – available here (the operative sections are below the line, with citations removed) – holds that, where a parishioner alleges purely emotional distress at the hands of the church, the Court cannot inquire into the nature of the ritual, and therefore cannot pass on the complaint.

The main problem with this reasoning is that, to get to that conclusion, Justice Medina misconstrues the nature of the complaint, characterizing the plaintiff’s bona fide emotional trauma as a sectarian dispute, in which the court cannot involve itself. To say that Medina is wrong is to be generous; more accurately, he can’t see the forest (emotional distress) through the trees (religious ritual). That a defendant pleads religion as a defense does not require a court of law to inquire into doctrine; an injury is an injury, whether or not it comes from a religious source, and it should be evaluated as such. Religion doesn’t excuse restraint & psychological abuse (“[a]ccording to Laura, church members forcibly held her arms crossed over her chest, despite her demands to be freed”), just like religion doesn’t excuse drug use.

“No” doesn’t mean “yes,” just because it’s inside a church. That you’re a member of a church doesn’t mean that you consent to psychological torment. It’s that simple. Doctrine need not be involved. I’m applying to clerk for the Texas Supreme Court, so I say this with a certain reluctance, but Justice Medina is categorically wrong.

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Medina, J., for the Court (truly egregious portions bolded & in red):

Although the Free Exercise Clause does not categorically insulate religious conduct from judicial scrutiny, it prohibits courts from deciding issues of religious doctrine. Chief Justice Jefferson asserts, however, that we go too far in protecting religious doctrine in this case, and, in effect, eliminate mental anguish as an element of damage against tortfeasors who allege their conduct was motivated by religious conviction. That, of course, is not our intent. We do not mean to imply that “under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity,” commit intentional torts upon their religious adherents. Freedom to believe may be absolute, but freedom of conduct is not, and “conduct even under religious guise remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”

Moreover, religious practices that threaten the public’s health, safety, or general welfare cannot be tolerated as protected religious belief. But religious practices that might offend the rights or sensibilities of a non-believer outside the church are entitled to greater latitude when applied to an adherent within the church. Particularly, when the adherent’s claim, as here, involves only intangible, emotional damages allegedly caused by a sincerely held religious belief, courts must carefully scrutinize the circumstances so as not to become entangled in a religious dispute. And while we can imagine circumstances under which an adherent might have a claim for compensable emotional damages as a consequence of religiously motivated conduct, this is not such a case.

The “laying of hands” and the presence of demons are part of the church’s belief system and accepted as such by its adherents. These practices are not normally dangerous or unusual and apparently arise in the church with some regularity. They are thus to be expected and are accepted by those in the church. That a particular member may find the practice emotionally disturbing and non-consensual when applied to her does not transform the dispute into a secular matter. “Courts are not arbiters of religious interpretation,” and the First Amendment does not cease to apply when parishioners disagree over church doctrine or practices because “it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.” Because determining the circumstances of Laura’s emotional injuries would, by its very nature, draw the Court into forbidden religious terrain, we conclude that Laura has failed to state a cognizable, secular claim in this case.